Publications

Full CV

2018

Faith and Humility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief,” The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Starr, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2018).

Lessons from Gettier,” The Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2018).

McCain on Propositionalism,” New Essays on Evidentialism, Kevin McCain, ed., Synthese Library, (New York: Springer Publications, forthcoming 2018).

Virtue Epistemology, Two Kinds of Internalism, and the Intelligibility Problem,” New Essays on Virtue Epistemology, Kristoph Kelp, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2018).

Theoretical Unity in Epistemology,” Festschrift for Peter Klein, Branden Fitelson, Cherie Braden, and Rodrigo Borges, eds., Springer Library, (New York: Springer Publications, forthcoming 2018).

2017

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 8, Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2017.

Understanding,” Oxford Handbook on the Epistemology of Theology, edited by Frederick D. Aquino and William J. Abraham, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 175-190.

Reply to Simion,” Logos & Episteme VIII, 1, (2017), pp. 113-116.

Rationality and Reflection, Oxford: Oxford University Press, paperback edition 2017.

The Cognitive Dimension of Heavenly Bliss,” Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays About Heaven, T. Ryan Byerly and Eric Silverman, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 62-81.

2016

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 7, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox,” Res Philosophica 93.3 (2016), pp. 509-532.

The Idea of Faith as Trust: Lessons in NonCognitivist Approaches to Faith,” Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne, Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey Brower, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 4-26.

2015

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

2014

Rationality and Reflection, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 5, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Epistemic Normativity,” Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, edited by John Turri and Clayton Littlejohn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 115-135.

Infinitist Justification and Proper Basing,” Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism, edited by John Turri and Peter Klein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 125-143.

2013

Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, paperback edition 2013.

Theories of Providence and Creation,” Res Philosophica, Vol. 90, No. 1, January 2013, pp. 51–69.

Affective Theism and People of Faith,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 37, edited by Howard Wettstein, 2013, pp. 109-128.

Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding,” Knowledge, Virtue, and Action, edited by Tim Henning and David Schweikard, (Boston: Routledge Publishing Co., 2013), pp. 151-175.

Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent,” New Essays on Disagreement, edited by Jennifer Lackey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 223-243.

2012

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.1, (March 2012), pp. 21-41.

Truth-Tracking and the Value of Knowledge,” The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, edited by Kelly Becker and Tim Black, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 101-121.

Coherentism,” A Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, (New York: Continuum Press, 2012), pp. 57-72.

2011

Destiny and Deliberation: Essays in Philosophical Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

“Knowledge and Understanding,” Chapter Eight of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, translated into Spanish and reprinted in Margarita Valdés and Dr. Miguel Ángel Fernández, eds.,Valores Epistémicos, (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011).

Against Pragmatic Encroachment,” Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 2.1 (2011), pp. 77-85.

The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent,” Evidentialism and Its Critics, edited by Trent Dougherty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 34-54.

Millar on the Value of Knowledge,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85.1, (2011) pp. 83-99.

2010

Norms of Assertion,” Assertion, edited by Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 233-251.

Virtue Epistemology,” Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker, (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 199-208.

Epistemic Justification,” Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker, (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 25-37.

“Heaven and Hell,” Oxford Bibliographies Online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0050 .

“Coherentism,” Oxford Bibliographies Online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0020 .

Resurrection, Heaven, and Hell,” A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition, Charles Taliaferro and Paul Draper, eds., (Boston: Routledge, 2010), pp. 630-639.

“Philosophy of Religion,”Oxford Bibliographies Online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0103 .

“Causation,” Trent Dougherty, co-author, Oxford Bibliographies Online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/display/id/obo-9780195396577-0017 .

“Sosa on Virtue Epistemology,” Crítica 42.125 (2010), pp. 47-62.

The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist,” Social Epistemology, edited by Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 89-112.

The Incarnation and the Knowability Paradox,” Synthese 173.1 (2010), pp. 89-105.

2009

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Religious Pluralism and the Buridan’s Ass Paradox,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1.1 (Spring 2009), pp. 1-26.

Conservation, Concurrence, and Counterfactuals of Freedom,” Metaphysics and God, edited by Kevin Tempe, (Malden, Mass: Routledge, 2009), pp. 112-126.

Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope,” New Essays on Knowability, Joseph Salerno, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 205-222.

The Value of Understanding,” Epistemic Value, edited by Pritchard, Haddock, and Millar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 95-112.

Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding,” Epistemic Value, edited by Pritchard, Haddock, and Millar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 309-313.

Responses to Critics,” Epistemic Value, edited by Pritchard, Haddock, and Millar, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 339-353.

Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries,” Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Patrick Greenough, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 140-160.

2008

The Knowability Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Paperback Edition 2008.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed., Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Pointless Truth,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XXXII (2008), pp. 199-212.

Five Questions about Epistemology,” Epistemology: 5 Questions, edited by Duncan Pritchard and Vincent Hendricks, (London: Automatic Press/VIP, 2008).

Critical Notice of Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (July 2008), pp. 272-81.

Contrastivism and Closure,” Social Epistemology 22.3 (2008), pp. 247-56.

Closure and Alternative Possibilities,” Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, John Greco, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 456-84.

Hell,” The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, edited by Jerry L. Walls, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 413-27.

Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?“ in Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2008), pp. 201-19 (originally published in The Monist 81.3 (1998), pp. 426-451).

“The Value of Knowledge is External to It,” Chapter One of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, reprinted in Duncan Pritchard and Ram Neta, eds., Arguing About Knowledge, (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 37-55.

2007

The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, New York: Cambridge University Press, Paperback Edition 2007.

Creation and Conservation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.

Propositionalism and the Metaphysics of Experience,” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007), edited by Sosa and Villanueva, pp. 165-78.

Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007), pp. 131-40.

Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat,” Alvin Plantinga: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, Deane-Peter Baker, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 107-24.

Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised entry 2007.

Heaven and Hell,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised entry 2007.

2006

The Knowability Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Epistemic Closure Principles,” Brian Weatherson, editor, Philosophy Compass 1/3 (2006): 256–267, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00027.x.

The Value of Knowledge and Truth,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006.

2005

Truth and the Epistemic Goal,” Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, eds., (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 285-95.

On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars’ Problem: A Defense of Propositionalism,” Veritas 50 (2005), edited by Claudio de Almeida, pp. 173-90.

2004

Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004), edited by Sosa and Villanueva, pp. 201-218.

Nozickian Epistemology and the Question of Closure,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3, special issue edited by Carla Bagnoli, 2004, pp. 351-364.

2003

The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003.

Heaven and Hell,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2003.

Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge,” in Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, Thomas F. Crisp, ed., (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co., 2003).

Jonathan Edwards on Hell,” Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, edited by Paul Helm and Oliver Crisp, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003), pp. 1-12.

Justification and Proper Basing,” The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, Erik Olsson, ed., (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co., 2003), pp. 43-62.

Simple Reliabilism and Agent Reliabilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66.2 (2003), pp. 451-457.

Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification,” American Philosophical Quarterly 40.1 (2003), pp. 3-18.

2002

On Behalf of Maverick Molinism,” Faith and Philosophy 19.3 (2002), pp. 348-357.

2001

Omniscience and Eternity: A Reply to Craig,” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001), pp. 369-376.

Divine Hiddenness: What is the Problem?The Hiddenness of God, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 149-163.

2000

“Omniscience, Divine” The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 498-499.

Externalism and Epistemology Worth Doing,” The Role of the Empirical (and of the A Priori) in Epistemology, David Henderson and Terry Horgan, eds., The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 38 Supplement (2000), pp. 27-42.

Zagzebski on Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000), pp. 191-196.

1999

Tennant on Knowability,” Michael Hand, co-author, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999), pp. 422-428.

Lewis on Finkish Dispositions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999), pp. 703-710.

Truth and Superassertibility,” Philosophical Studies 93 (1999), pp. 1-19.

1998

Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?The Monist 81.3 (1998), pp. 426-451 (Reprinted in Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2008).

The Epistemic Paradoxes,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998.

1997

Heaven and Hell,” A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 562-568.

In Defense of Coherentism,” Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1997), pp. 299-306.

1996

Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, ed., Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.

Plantinga’s Proper Function Theory of Warrant,” Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology, J.L. Kvanvig, ed., (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).

1995

The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism,” Noûs 29 (1995), pp. 481-500.

Coherentists’ Distractions,” Philosophical Topics 23 (1995), pp. 257-75.

Coherentism: Misconstrual and Misapprehension,” Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1995), pp. 159-68.

Subjective Justification,” in Ernest Sosa, ed., Knowledge and Justification Volume II, (Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1995 (reprinted from Mind 93 (January 1984), pp. 71-84).

1994

A Critique of Van Fraassen’s Voluntaristic Epistemology,” Synthese 98 (1994), pp. 325-348.

A Critical Notice of Alston’s Perceiving God,” Faith and Philosophy 11.2 (April, 1994), pp. 311-321.

He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz’ Lapse,” Southwest Philosophy Review 10 (January, 1994), pp. 137-146.

1993

The Problem of Hell, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

1992

The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology, in the Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory Series, Paul K. Moser, general editor, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.

Can a Coherence Theory Appeal to Appearance States?“ Wayne D. Riggs, co-author, Philosophical Studies 67 (1992), pp. 197-217.

Hasker on Fatalism,” Philosophical Studies 65 (1992), pp. 91-101.

1991

The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism,” Hugh J. McCann, co-author, Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, James E. Tomberlin, ed. (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 1991), pp. 587-616.

1990

The Basic Notion of Justification,” Christopher Menzel, co-author, Philosophical Studies 59 (1990), pp. 235-261.

“Theism, Reliabilism and the Cognitive Ideal,” Michael J. Beaty, ed., Philosophy and the Christian Faith, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 71-91.

1989

Conservatism and Its Virtues,” Synthese 79 (1989), pp. 143-163.

Adams on Actualism and Presentism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50.2 (December 1989), pp. 289-298.

Unknowable Truths and the Doctrine of Omniscience,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 57.3 (Fall 1989), pp. 485-507.

The Haecceity Theory and Perspectival Limitation,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67.3 (September 1989), pp. 295-305.

The Analogy Argument for a Limited Account of Omniscience,” International Philosophical Quarterly 29.2 (June 1989), pp. 129-137.

1988

“Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World,” Hugh J. McCann, co-author, Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, Thomas V. Morris, ed., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 13-49.

1987

On Lemke’s Defense of A Causal Basing Requirement,”Analysis 47.3 (June 1987), pp. 162-167.

1986

The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., Library of Philosophy and Religion, John Hick, general editor, 1986, and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.

The Confusion Over Foundationalism,” Philosophia 16.3-4 (December 1986), pp. 345-355.

How to Be a Reliabilist,” American Philosophical Quarterly 23.2 (April 1986), pp. 189-198.

1985

Swain on the Basing Relation,” Analysis 45.3 (June 1985), pp. 153-158.

Is There an ‘Us’ in ‘Justification’?“, Synthese 62.1 (January 1985), pp. 63-74.

1984

“Descriptional Theories of Meaning,” Southwest Philosophical Review 1.1 (1984), pp. 182-187.

Credulism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16.2 (1984), pp. 101-110.

Divine TranscendenceReligious Studies 20 (Summer 1984), pp. 377-387.

What is Wrong With Minimal Foundationalism?Erkenntnis 21 (1984), pp. 175-184.

Subjective Justification,” Mind (January 1984), pp. 71-84.

1983

The Evidentialist Objection,” American Philosophical Quarterly 20.1 (January 1983), pp. 47-57.

1978

“Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” Wisconsin Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy (Spring 1978), pp. 24-30.

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